CAG Report on Commomwealth Games 2010

The current audit of CWG-2010 covers almost all aspect of commomwealth games . It covers the period from May 2003 (when the bid was submitted) to December 2010 after the conclusion of the Games.as well as a multiplicity of activities such as  hosting of the Games , the development of sporting venues, the Games Village, city infrastructure projects and other associated/ supporting activities — executed by a diverse set of agencies. Main findings of the report are as follows 


Governance
1) Since goverment gauranteed meeting of full cost ,Games needed to be fully in control of government .
2) Appontment of Kalmadi the conversion of the originally envisaged Government-owned OC into a body outside Governmental control, without commensurate accountability to Government and concomitant controls to ensure propriety and transparency (despite full financial guarantee and funding from Government).
3) In the absence of a single point of authority and accountability and the lack of a clear governance structure, a multiplicity of co-ordination committees were created, disbanded, and reconstituted at different points of time. This approach was not methodical, consistent and effective, and also led to complete diffusion of accountability.
Planning
1) Though 7 years were provided for organizing the game but OC created after a long period of 2 years in 2005 .
2) while EKS was appointed by the OC as the consultant for preparation of venue briefs and site plans only in July 2006. 

This resulted in delya in projects
Finance
1) government was unable to access realistic cost of the games, IOA estimated it to be Rs.12oocr only in 2003 but eventually in oct 2010 it increased to whooping 18,532cr
2) there were also numerous instances of delays in grant of budgetary and financial approvals by the GoI.
oc Decision Making
1) The internal control environment and decision making structures within the OC were highly inadequate. 
2) Documentation were not properly done
3) Contract management by the OC was irregular and deficient. 
4) There was  numerous instances of single tendering, award on ‘nomination basis’, award of contracts to ineligible vendors, inconsistent use of restrictive Pre-Qualification conditions to limit competition to favour particular vendors, inadequate time for bidding, cancellation and re-tendering of contracts, and inexplicable delays in contract finalization, all of which seriously compromised transparency and economy. 
5)Further, there were numerous deficiencies in the appointment of external consultants and advisors and management of the multiplicity of contracts thereof.
Revenue
1) The OC  could generate committed sponsorship revenue of just Rs 375.16 crore (against the target of Rs 960 crore), out of which nearly 67 per cent was from Government agencies/ PSUs. 
2) No revenue has been received on account of merchandising and licensing rights. 
3) The agreement for national broadcasting rights between OC and Prasar Bharati was signed only on 23 September 2010, resulting in generation of just Rs 24.70 crore of revenues for the OC.
Consultancy
Event Knowledge Services (EKS) was awarded five consultancy contracts relating to venue appraisal/ briefs, project monitoring, games planning and workforce (awarded to an EKS consortium) during 2005-08. Three of these contracts were awarded on nomination basis, facilitated by strong patronage from the CGF (with which EKS had a close link). Tendering conditions for the other two contracts were tailored to suit EKS. We are also unable to verify the need for this multiplicity of contracts, and the possible overlap between the deliverables from different contracts. The overlays contracts were signed at exorbitant rates, causing huge financial loss to the OC (and the GoI).
Ceremonies
1)  The OC made highly suspect payments of £386,237 to two little known entities — AM Films UK Ltd and AM Car and Van Hire Ltd — for diverse and unconnected services for the QBR Launch ceremony. 
2) The assignment of work and payments were highly questionable; associated approvals and clearances were obtained and payments made with uncommon haste.
3) Large amounts were also paid in cash, perhaps to avoid leaving a transaction trail. 
4) The role of Shri TS Darbari and Shri Sanjay Mahindroo, who were unrelated to OC’s Ceremony Functional Area, in the QBR Launch Ceremony is also questionable.
Technology
1) Planning for TSR (Timing, Scoring and Results system) was badly delayed and initiated only in January 2009. There were clear and repeated interventions at different stages to steer the TSR contract towards Swiss Timing Omega and eliminate MSL, Spain. 
2) OC was left with a single financial bidder, effectively eliminating any opportunity for competitive pricing of TSR. This facilitated award of the TSR contract to Swiss Timing Omega at an exorbitant cost of Rs 135.27 crore (compared to just Rs 39.84 crore equivalent at Melbourne CWG-2006 from the same vendor).
Workforce
1)It was found that the OC managed the work force in an arbitrary and ad hoc manner, leaving ample scope for patronage, favouritism and nepotism in the appointment and promotion of officials. 
2) The tendering process was clearly tailored to favour EKS. 
3) Security and reference checks were not carried out for most employees. 
4)Certain employees, whose past records should have rendered them unfit for appointment in the OC, were nevertheless appointed.
Games Village
1) Except for strengthening of the Akshardam bund, there was no evidence of compliance with the upstream flood mitigation/ abatement measures on the river Yamuna stipulated by the Ministry of Environment and Forests while according conditional environmental clearance. 
2) CAG could also not verify compliance with the orders of the Hon’ble Supreme Court, which had permitted construction on the basis of an assurance regarding monitoring of construction activities by a PM-appointed committee in association with Dr RK Pachauri.
Media Services
 Although Doordarshan was indicated as the Host Broadcaster in the May 2003 bid, it was formally notified by the OC only in March 2007. The award of the broadcasting services contract by PB to SIS Live was flawed on several counts. Only one bidder, SIS Live, was qualified on technical grounds, and the contract was awarded on a single financial bid, without any competition.

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